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ABSTRACT
This paper presents LDP-Fed, a novel federated learning system
with a formal privacy guarantee using local differential privacy
(LDP). Existing LDP protocols are developed primarily to ensure
data privacy in the collection of single numerical or categorical
values, such as click count in Web access logs. However, in fed-
erated learning model parameter updates are collected iteratively
from each participant and consist of high dimensional, continuous
values with high precision (10s of digits after the decimal point),
making existing LDP protocols inapplicable. To address this chal-
lenge in LDP-Fed, we design and develop two novel approaches.
First, LDP-Fed’s LDP Module provides a formal differential privacy
guarantee for the repeated collection of model training parameters
in the federated training of large-scale neural networks over multi-
ple individual participantsâĂŹ private datasets. Second, LDP-Fed
implements a suite of selection and filtering techniques for perturb-
ing and sharing select parameter updates with the parameter server.
We validate our system deployed with a condensed LDP protocol
in training deep neural networks on public data. We compare this
version of LDP-Fed, coined CLDP-Fed, with other state-of-the-art
approaches with respect to model accuracy, privacy preservation,
and system capabilities.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Privacy-preserving protocols; Trust
frameworks; •Computingmethodologies→ Learning settings.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, machine learning (ML) algorithms have required that
all relevant training data be held by a trusted central party. How-
ever, in the age of IoT, data is often generated and captured from
distributed edge locations with different ownerships from multiple
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independent parties. Distributed systems were therefore developed
for the distributed training of ML models through cluster nodes
with shared data access or capabilities for data sharing with one
or a few trusted central master node(s). However, when the edge
nodes are owned by independent parties, there may not exist such
a centralized point of trust. Furthermore, legal restrictions such as
HIPAA [3], CCPA [15], or GDPR [18] and business competitiveness
may further limit the sharing of sensitive data.
In response, federated learning (FL) has emerged as an attractive
collaborative learning infrastructure. In a FL system, data owners
(participants) do not need to share raw data with one another or
rely on a single trusted entity for distributed training of ML models.
Instead, participants collaborate to jointly train a ML model by
executing local training algorithms on their own private local data
and only sharing model parameters with the parameter server. This
parameter server serves as a central aggregator to appropriately
aggregate the local parameter updates and then share the aggre-
gated updates with every participant. While FL allows participants
to keep their raw data local, recent work has shown it is insuf-
ficient in protecting the privacy of the underlying training data
from known inference attacks [16]. Model parameters exchanged
during the training process [16] as well as outputs from the trained
model [21, 25] remain as attack surfaces for privacy leakage.
Existing solutions to protect FL systems from such privacy at-
tacks require trusted aggregators [17] or heavy cryptographic tech-
niques [6, 23] which do not allow individual participants to define
different local privacy guarantees, are insufficient for meaning-
fully protecting each high dimensional parameter vector against
privacy leakage in the presence of high dimensional parameter
vectors [6, 19], or have focused on low dimensional models [2, 26].
In this paper, we proposed LDP-Fed, a novel FL system for the
joint training of deep neural network (DNN) models under the
protection of the formal local differential privacy framework. LDP-
Fed allows participants to efficiently train complex models such
that each participant is formally protected from privacy inference
attacks according to their own locally defined privacy setting. This
paper makes two original contributions. First, we develop a feder-
ated training approach that can perform LDP-based perturbation
on complex model parameter updates according to the local privacy
budget while minimizing the overwhelming impact of noise on the
joint ML training process. Second, we also present our parameter
update sharing method for the selective sharing of model parameter
updates at various rounds of the iterative LDP-Fed training process.
We evaluate LDP-Fed against state-of-the-art privacy-preserving
FL approaches in both accuracy and system features.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Deep Neural Network Training
Deep neural network (DNN) models are composed of many layers
of basic building block nodes such as affine functions or simple
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Figure 1: Privacy leakage in federated learning systems.
non-linear functions (e.g. sigmoids, rectified linear units (ReLU),
etc.). A DNN model is therefore trained by fitting the parameters of
these nodes to a known set of training inputs (provided to the first
layer of nodes) and outputs (desired output from the last layer).
Specifically, a loss function L is quantifies the error between
the desired outputs and the DNN generated output. Given a DNN
with parameters θ , the loss L(θ ) of the DNN on the training set
{x1,x2, . . . ,xN } is the average loss over the set, i.e.L(θ ) = 1N
∑
i L(θ ,xi ).
DNN training therefore seeks the parameters θ which minimize
this loss. While ideally training will result in the loss global minima,
training in practice is rarely expected to reach this global value and
instead finds an acceptably small loss point.
The process of minimizing the loss L is often done through
applying the technique known as stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
iteratively to subsets of the training data known as minibatches. At
each step a batch B is selected and an estimation of the gradient
∇θL(θ ) is computed as gB = 1|B |
∑
x ∈B ∇θL(θ ,x). The training
algorithm then updates θ in the direction −gB toward a local min-
ima. Multiple systems are available to enable efficient training and
evaluation of these DNNs models [1, 8, 13].
2.2 Federated Learning
As privacy concerns and legislation continues to mount, FL systems
such as [5] have seen increased attention. FL systems remove the
necessity of a central data location to train DNNs. Model parameters
which minimize loss across multiple datasets are instead identified
through model training that is done locally at the edge.
In a FL setting, N participants, each with independent datasets
containing the same features and output classes, agree on a DNN
model architecture. A central server (aggregator) then randomly
initializes the model parameters θ0 which are then distributed to
each participant so that each may initialize their own copy of the
model. At each round r ∈ [0,E) of training, participants receive a
copy of the aggregator’s model parameters θr . Each participant Pi
then conducts model training locally as described in Section 2.1
to generate updated parameters θr+1,i and uploads them to the
aggregator. The aggregator then computes the average of value for
each parameter and updates the global model with the parameters
θr+1 = 1N
∑
i θr+1,i . This process is continued either for a pre-
determined number of rounds E or until the model converges.
While FL allows for private data to remain local to each partici-
pant, this data locality approach proves insufficient in protecting
training data privacy as FL systems remain vulnerable to privacy
inference attacks. Figure 1 highlights the multiple points of poten-
tial privacy leakage in federated learning. Information may leak
to the central aggregator service (leakage point 1) as well as other
participants (leakage point 2) by way of the shared parameter up-
dates which are a type of encoding of each participant’s private
data. Recent work has indeed demonstrated that effective mem-
bership inference privacy attacks may be launched given access
to these shared model updates [16]. Additionally, the final model
itself will also leak with prediction outputs (leakage point 3) leading
attackers to infer information about the underlying training data
points [21, 25].
2.3 Local Differential Privacy
To combat inference attacks against shared data values, companies
including Google, Apple, and Microsoft employ local differential
privacy (LDP) [9, 11, 22], the state-of-the-art in privacy-preserving
data collection. Rather than uploading raw data values, users in
an LDP system perturb their data v using an algorithm Ψ and
instead upload Ψ(v). This perturbed value Ψ(v) is then guaranteed
to protectv from inference attacks according to a privacy parameter
ϵ where a lower ϵ value indicates a higher level of privacy. This
guarantee is formalized as follows.
Definition 2.1. (ϵ-LDP). A randomized algorithm Ψ satisfies ϵ-
local differential privacy (ϵ-LDP), where ϵ > 0, if and only if for
any inputs v1,v2 in universeU, we have:
∀y ∈ Ranдe(Ψ) : Pr [Ψ(v1) = y]
Pr [Ψ(v2) = y] ≤ e
ϵ
where Range(Ψ) is the set of all possible outputs of algorithm Ψ.
2.3.1 Condensed Local Differential Privacy. In [12], authors pro-
pose a specialization of LDP, Condensed Local Differential Privacy
(CLDP). CLDP ensures privacy according to a privacy parameter α
where, as with ϵ , a lower α value indicates a higher level of privacy.
CLDP, however, also considers a distance metric d in its perturba-
tion algorithm Φ. Specifically, letU denote the finite universe of
possible values for user datav . Additionally, let d : U×U → [0,∞)
be a distance function that measures the distance between any two
items v1,v2 ∈ U. CLDP is then formalized as follows.
Definition 2.2. (α-CLDP). A randomized algorithm Φ satisfies α-
condensed local differential privacy (α-CLDP), where α > 0, if and
only if for any inputs v1,v2 ∈ U:
∀y ∈ Ranдe(Φ) : Pr [Φ(v1) = y]
Pr [Φ(v2) = y] ≤ e
α ·d (v1,v2)
where Range(Φ) is the set of all possible outputs of algorithm Φ.
While the definitions of LDP and CLDP are similar, their privacy
parameters and indistinguishability properties vary as α-CLDP,
indistinguishability is also controlled by the itemsâĂŹ distance
d(·, ·) in addition to α . Therefore, as d increases, α must decrease
to compensate, making α ≪ ϵ . Previous work [12] provides de-
tails for converting ϵ to α . To guarantee α-CLDP, the Exponential
Mechanism (EM) is applied to a raw user value v end as follows.
Exponential Mechanism (EM). Let v ∈ U be the raw user
data, and let the Exponential Mechanism ΦEM take as input v and
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Figure 2: Private Federated Learning with LDP-Fed
output a perturbed value inU, i.e.,ΦEM : U →U. Then,ΦEM that
produces output y with the following probability satisfies α-CLDP:
∀y ∈ U : Pr [ΦEM (v) = y] = e
−α ·d (v,y)
2∑
z∈U e
−α ·d (v,z)
2
2.3.2 Privacy Accounting. In differentially private federated train-
ing of DNN models, an important issue arises in accounting for
the multiple iterations of the training algorithm. That is, each par-
ticipant and therefore each private dataset will be queried during
multiple rounds of training. The composability of differential pri-
vacy allows for such iterations to be accounted for by accumulating
the privacy cost at each round of the training as well as the multiple
parameters included in each model update.
To account for the iterative nature of DNN training, the Sequen-
tial Composition theorem states that for functions f1, . . . , fn where
fi satisfies ϵi -DP for each i ∈ [1,n], the release of the outputs
f1(D), . . . , fn (D) satisfies (∑ni=1 ϵi )-DP. The privacy amplification
theorem [4, 14] additionally states that if random samples are se-
lected rather than all available data, then each round satisfying
ϵ-DP incurs only a cost of (qϵ) against the privacy budget where
q = L/N is the sampling ratio.
3 FEDERATED LEARNINGWITH LDP-FED
The LDP-Fed system coordinates the federated learning of a DNN
with N participants (clients) and one parameter server. LDP-Fed
integrates a LDP privacy guarantee into the general architecture of
the FL algorithm as shown in Figure 2 to protect participants’ data
from inference attacks.
Specifically, consider N participants with the same dataset struc-
ture and learning task who wish to collaboratively train a DNN
model in a federated fashion. That is, each participant wishes to
perform local training on its own private data and only share pa-
rameter updates to the server. Additionally, participants wish to
address FL privacy risks (Section 2.2) with an individualized LDP
guarantee (Section 2.3). To accomplish these goals, we present the
federated training process of our system LDP-Fed, from both client
(participant) and server perspectives:
On the individual client side:
(1) Participants initialize local DNN instances with model pa-
rameters θ0 and each local LDP Module is initialized with
privacy parameters according to individual preferences.
(2) Each participant locally computes training gradients accord-
ing to their private, local dataset.
(3) Each participant performs perturbation on their gradients
according to their local instance of the LDP Module.
(4) Model parameter updates are anonymously sent to the k-
Client Selection Module which uniformly at random accepts
or rejects updates with probability q = k/N .
(5) Each participant waits to receive aggregated parameter up-
dates from the parameter server. Upon receiving the aggre-
gated updates, each participant updates its local DNN model,
and proceeds to step 2 to start the next iteration.
On the parameter server side:
(1) The parameter server generates initial model parameters θ0
and sends to each participant.
(2) The server waits to receive k parameter updates randomly
selected by the k-Client Selection Module.
(3) Once parameter updates are received, the Aggregation Mod-
ule aggregates the updates, i.e. averages the gradient updates
to determine new model parameters.
EdgeSys ’20, April 27, 2020, Heraklion, Greece Stacey Truex, Ling Liu, Ka-Ho Chow, Mehmet Emre Gursoy, Wenqi Wei
(4) The parameter server updates model parameters and sends
updated values back to participants to update local models.
The above steps iterate for both the N clients and the parameter
sever until a pre-determined condition is reached such as reaching
a maximum number of rounds (iterations) or a public test set no
longer reporting improved performance (convergence). Compared
with traditional FL systems, LDP-Fed introduces two new compo-
nents: (1) the Local Differential Privacy Module running on each of
the N clients and (2) the k-Client Selection Module.
Local Differential Privacy Module. For each client, the LDP
Module takes as input the high dimensional vector of model pa-
rameter updates, say 29,034 distinct values, and outputs a vector
containing the perturbed updates according to the participantâĂŹs
chosen privacy context. In the first prototype of LDP-Fed, we set
the default privacy definition to be α-CLDP-Fed, a variation of
α-CLDP. While the definition of α-CLDP in [12] is provided for
LDP perturbation on single integer values in finite spaces, gradient
values are instead real values with high precision (10s after decimal
points). Therefore the α-CLDP-Fed Module introduces a precision
parameter ρ and a clipping range parameter c such that each param-
eter update is converted to an integer in the range [−c · 10ρ , c · 10ρ ].
By transforming the clipped parameters into integers according
to the precision parameter ρ and clipping range parameter c , we
can define the α-CLDP-Fed system with Ordinal-CLDP using EM
from [12]. Larger c and ρ values will result in a larger universe
space but allow for more specificity in the model update.
Another problem with applying α-CLDP from [12] to FL is that
its protocol only accounts for single item uploads. In FL, LDP-Fed
needs to iteratively upload a high dimensional parameter vector,
which has typically 10,000 or more real valued parameters of high
precision. Assume k = N in the k-Client Selection Module, let E be
the total number of iterations for a FL task, and let α be the total
privacy budget. To guarantee α-CLDP, we must partition α into
E small budgets, one for each of the E total iterations such that
α =
∑E−1
i=0 αi . Let θi be the total number of parameter updates to
be uploaded to the parameter server at the ith iteration from any
of the k selected clients, with αi denoting the portion of the overall
privacy budget α allocated to the ith iteration. To guarantee privacy
in LDP-Fed, we therefore must set αp = αi|θi | as the privacy budget
when applying Ordinal-CLDP to each parameter update in θi .
k-Client Selection Module. Just as conventional FL systems
do not require every participant to share their local training param-
eter updates in each round, training in LDP-Fed results in only k
participants’ parameter updates being uploaded to the parameter
server for any given round with k <= N . As the discarded updates
do not introduce any privacy cost, sampling amplification allows
for a tighter bound of α =
∑E−1
i=0 q · αi with q = kN <= 1.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
All experiments were conducted on an example FL system with
N = 50 participants and the k-client Selection Module set to ran-
domly select k = 9 updates at each round. The DNN model archi-
tecture used has two convolutional layers each followed by a batch
normalization layer and a 2D max-pool layer. The final network
layer is a single fully connected layer with 1,568 hidden units. We
conduct 80 total rounds of training, i.e. E is set to 80. To evaluate
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Figure 3: α-CLDP-Fed compared to other FL methods.
the effectiveness of LDP-Fed, we also implemented a number of
related methods, such as Non-Private FL, Local Learning, and se-
cure multiparty computation (SMC) methods for comparison and
analysis. Related methods requiring ϵ values were set with the ϵ
value equivalent to α = 1.0 given the appropriate ρ and c settings
according to the conversion approach provided in [12].
Non-Private FL. In non-private federated learning, the LDP
Module is not activated and the k-Client Selection Module receives
complete model parameter updates from participants in the clear.
Local Learning. The results of local learning are reported as the
average accuracy results received by the individual participants if
they were to train the DNN model on their own local datasets with-
out sharing parameter updates. Baseline. Random guess baseline
of 10%. SMC. With SMC, the same process as Non-Private FL is fol-
lowed except that model updates are encrypted when sent to the k-
Client Selection Module and then decrypted only post-aggregation
in the Aggregation Module. Here parameter updates again need to
be integers and therefore only ρ =10 digits after the decimal are
preserved.Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent
(DPSGD). Authors in [2] propose a centralized approach to differen-
tially private deep learning wherein noise is added to each gradient
by the optimizer. We compare the impact of using LDP-Fed with the
impact of using such a differentially private optimizer on each par-
ticipant. SMC and DPSGD Hybrid (Hybrid-One). Authors in [23]
propose a FL system which leverages an optimizer similar to that
in the DPSGD method. However, the hybrid approach leverages
SMC to decrease the scale of noise required at each participant.
All experiments are carried out on the FashionMNIST dataset,
consisting of 60,000 training examples and 10,000 testing exam-
ples [27]. Each example is a 28 ÃŮ28 size gray-level image depicting
an item from one of ten different fashion classes.
4.1 Limited Updates with LDP-Fed
We first evaluate the effectiveness of LDP-Fed with α-CLDP-Fed, a
version of LDP-Fed with α-CLDP in the LDP Module. The compar-
ison study includes six existing federated learning scenarios and
three FL settings using CLDP: CLDP-Basic, CLDP-Single Layer, and
our recommended α-CLDP-Fed. All private methods have a total
privacy budget equivalent to α = 1.0.
Figure 3 reports the results. CLDP-Basic refers to a baseline im-
plementation of α-CLDP wherein participants provide updates at
each round for all parameters in the DNN. Therefore, the budget α
in CLDP-Basic must be divided amongst all the 29,034 parameters.
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# of Cycles Accuracy Std Deviation
1 86.85% 0.12
2 86.20% 0.61
4 86.89% 0.10
5 86.93% 0.12
10 86.30% 0.24
16 85.28% 0.11
Table 1: Impact of introducing cycle-based approach in α-
CLDP-Fed. A minimum of c ′ = number of cycles rounds al-
located to each layer.
As shown in Figure 3, the CLDP-Basic displays the worst accuracy,
below the random guest baseline of 10%. This indicates that apply-
ing the privacy budget uniformly across all parameter updates can
cause untenable loss of training accuracy for large, complex models.
Instead, α-CLDP-Fed presents a novel and intelligent algorithm for
local differential privacy budget allocation and perturbation at each
iteration throughout a FL workflow. In α-CLDP-Fed, participants
upload only a subset of the parameters at each round, resulting in
a higher budget allocated to individual parameter uploads. We first
describe CLDP-Single Layer.
In CLDP-Single Layer, rather than sending a complete set θ of
parameter updates at every round, each of the selected k partici-
pants at round i only perturbs and shares θi ⊂ θ with the parameter
server, where θi contains parameter updates for only a single layer
of the DNN. The budget allocated to each parameter can then be
increased to αp = αi|θi | where αi is the budget allocated to round
i . Figure 3 shows that the CLDP-Single Layer algorithm signifi-
cantly outperforms the CLDP-Basic algorithm and results in a final
accuracy of 84.89%. In CLDP-Single Layer, each layer is allocated
an even number of rounds and each round an even slice of the
budget. Specifically, given ℓ layers, the updates sent during the first
E
ℓ rounds include only parameter updates for the parameters in
the DNN output layer. During each subsequent Eℓ set of rounds,
updates are for parameters one layer backward in the network.
In contrast to CLDP-Single Layer, α-CLDP-Fed allocates the
number of rounds proportionate to the percentage of the mod-
elâĂŹs total parameters contained within that layer, i.e. for layer
i , Ei = |θi ||θ | E total rounds are dedicated to updating parameters
in layer i . A minimum of 1 round is reserved for each layer. The
same backward stepping approach is used as in CLDP-Single Layer.
In α-CLDP-Fed the budget is also allocated proportionate to layer
size. Figure 3 shows that α-CLDP-Fed further improves the training
accuracy of CLDP-Single Layer with the highest final accuracy
among the privacy-preserving approaches with 86.85% accuracy.
Furthermore, Figure 3 shows that both α-CLDP-Fed and CLDP-
Single Layer outperform the non-private Local Learning, DPSGD,
and even Hybrid methods.
4.2 Impact of LDP-Fed Perturbation Cycles
In LDP-Fed we further introduces cycles to control when different
parameter updates are shared with the parameter server. Each
cycle is implemented in terms of iteration rounds. That is, let c ′ =
number of cycles. One cycle is then Ec ′ rounds with each cycle being
allocated αc ′ of the privacy budget. Rounds and budget are then
allocated within each cycle to individual layers according to the
strategy in Section 4.1. This allows layers to be revisited for updates
within the training process. We report the impact of varying the
number of cycles in α-CLDP-Fed in Table 1. This set of experiments
shows that setting the number of cycles to 5 will result in a high,
stable accuracy of 86.93% averaged across runs with a standard
deviation of 0.12. In LDP-Fed, the default cycle value is set to 5.
5 SYSTEM FEATURE COMPARISON
We have reported experimental comparison of our α-CLDP-Fed
method for privacy preserving federated learning with several rep-
resentative approaches. We additionally provide a system feature
comparison in Table 2; highlighting the value-added feature bene-
fits of using LDP-Fed. First, LDP-Fed system does not require heavy
cryptographic protocols which may not be suitable for edge devices
engaged in FL. Second, LDP-Fed allows individual participants to
locally define their own privacy level through the LDP Module.
This is a valuable feature as previous work [20, 24] has indicated
that vulnerability to privacy attacks is not uniform and may be
more acute for some participants’ datasets, leading to a desire for
a stricter privacy guarantee. Last, but not the least, LDP-Fed pro-
vides formal protection from known privacy inference attacks while
demonstrating an ability to maintain good accuracy in the presence
of large, complex models
6 RELATEDWORK
The LDP-Fed system relates to both FL and privacy-preserving ML.
Federated Learning Approaches. In [28] authors propose a distrib-
ute data mining system with DP, but their results demonstrate a
significant accuracy loss and the system requires a trusted aggre-
gator to add the necessary noise. In [17], while several “teacher”
models are independently trained, a trusted aggregator must pro-
vide a DP query interface to a “student” model with unlabelled
public data. [6] introduces cryptographic protocols to protect in-
dividual updates from being seen prior to aggregation, but leaves
the aggregate updates and final predictive model vulnerable to in-
ference attacks. Additional protocols allow users to leverage such
cryptographic techniques to decrease the scale of noise [7, 10, 23].
These approaches require expensive cryptographic operations and
either remove the ability of individual participants to identify pri-
vacy levels locally or demonstrate higher accuracy loss.
Privacy-Preserving ML. [19] similarly presents a distributed learn-
ing system using DP without a central trusted party. However, the
DP guarantee is per-parameter and becomes meaningless for mod-
els with a large number of parameters. [26] also proposes an LDP
protocol for multidimensional continuous data, however their ex-
periments entailed 4 million users and <20 features for training
smaller dimensional models.
7 CONCLUSION
We have presented LDP-Fed, a novel federated learning approach
with LDP. Our system allows participants to efficiently train com-
plex models while providing formal privacy protection. The design
of LDP-Fed has two unique features. First, it enables participants to
customize their LDP privacy budget locally according to their own
preferences. Second, LDP-Fed implements a novel privacy preserv-
ing collaborative training approach towards utility-aware privacy
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Privacy-Preserving Efficient Locally Defined Protection from Handles Complex
Federated Learning Method Privacy Guarantee Inference Attacks Models
SMC [6] ✗ ✗ ∼ ✓
ϵ-DP Parameter Sharing [19] ✓ ✓ ∼ ✓
Local Optimizer [2] ∼ ✓ ✓ ✗
Hybrid-One [23] ✗ ✗ ✓ ∼
Continuous ϵ-LDP [26] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
LDP-Fed ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 2: Comparison of methods for private federated model training.
perturbation to prevent uncontrolled noise from overwhelming
the FL training algorithm in the presence of large, complex model
parameter updates. The α-CLDP-Fed algorithm design also exhibits
a successful formal development of extending the traditional LDP
theory, intended for single categorical values, to our LDP-Fed al-
gorithm capable of handling high dimensional, continuous, and
large scale model parameter updates. We provide empirical and
analytical comparison of LDP-Fed with the state-of-the-art privacy-
preserving FL approaches in both accuracy and system features.
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